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The climate of debate: How institutional factors shape legislative discourses on climate
change. A comparative framing perspective.
Legislative  actors  and  their  institutional  settings  constitute  some  of  the  central
antecedents of the media’s coverage of political issues, not least since they lie at the very
heart  of the democratic  law-making process. Yet, although theories central  to the field of
political  communication have long documented the orientation  of the media towards elite
policy  actors  (e.g.  Bennett,  1990),  we  know  little  about  the  contexts  in  which  they  are
embedded. This is particularly the case for those stages that represent the day-to-day dealings
in plenary debates, committee meetings, hearings, etc.—in other words, the courant normal of
politics—which make up the bulk of the policymaking process but mostly lie outside the brief
peaks of political contest that occur during elections and popular referenda.
This  lack  of  scholarly  attention  is  not  specific  to  communication  research  as  a
discipline,  as  the  contributions  of  political  science  have  remained  equally  scant.  Political
scientists, particularly those working in one of the various fields of neo-institutionalism, have
long emphasised the role of institutional configurations and their informal rules in the political
process (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). At the same time, even those
working  within  one  of  the  more  recently  developed  sub-disciplines—labelled  “discursive
institutionalism”  (see the overview in V. A. Schmidt, 2008), which gives precedence to the
discursive moment and its explanatory power in the law-making process—have only rarely
examined one of the most immediate variables of interest, namely the structures of legislative
discourses (see, e.g., V. A. Schmidt, 2002).
The present article ties in with the research interests of these two academic fields but
extends them in important ways. Located at the nexus between communication research and
political  science,  the  study  foregrounds  parliament  as  the  central  institutional  locus  of
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deliberation  in  democracies  and examines  how institutional  configurations  of the political
system affect the discursive structure of political  debates in legislative bodies. Since their
actors  occupy a central  position both in  the policymaking process  and the public  sphere,
shedding  light  on  their  discursive  interactions  allows  us  to  establish  more  clearly  how
institutions and discourses are related and thereby gain a better understanding of one of the
major preconditions of media coverage. As we are interested in the effects that institutions
have  on  discourses,  the  study  employs  a  comparative  perspective  juxtaposing  legislative
discourses on the issue of climate change across four countries—Switzerland, Germany, the
UK and the US—during the courant normal of day-to-day politics.
Conceptually,  the study is guided by two main assumptions.  First,  we posit  that the
configuration of political institutions in a country affects both the degree of contestation with
which  an  issue  is  debated  by  legislative  actors  and  the  inclusion  of  non-political  actors.
Second, the  degree of contestation and the actor diversity, in turn, have an effect on how
salient the issue is and how broad the range of perspectives is in terms of the actors’ frames. 
The contributions of the article are threefold. From the perspective of both 
communication research and political science, it highlights the importance of relating 
legislative discourses to the institutional configurations in which they are embedded. It 
examines the resulting differences in the context of climate change, an issue that has received 
extensive scholarly attention in terms of how it is covered by the media (see, e.g., Boykoff, 
2007; Grundmann & Scott, 2014; Painter & Ashe, 2012), but where research on how it is 
processed in political institutions remains scarce (Fisher, Waggle, & Leifeld, 2012). Second, 
and related to this, such a shift in the research focus is all the more warranted, since the media
tend to “index” their political coverage to the positions, arguments and perspectives presented
by political actors (Bennett, 1990). Finally, the article contributes to the current research on 
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polarisation in political institutions (Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006), as it shows how 
formal configurations affect the degree of contestation in legislatures.
The article proceeds as follows: the next section introduces Lijphart’s (2012) distinction
between consensus and majoritarian democracies as the theoretical framework, which allows 
us to examine the differences between legislative discourses with regard to the analytical 
dimensions of polarisation, issue salience, and actor and frame diversity outlined above. The 
methodology section specifies the country and issue selection, introduces the framing 
approach the study employs to analyse the legislative discourses and develops the measures 
used to test the hypotheses. The empirical section presents the results of the analysis, the 
implications of which are discussed in the concluding section, which also addresses the 
limitations of the study and sketches areas of future research.
1. Theory
Legislative discourses are not independent of the institutional arrangements in which 
they are embedded (V. A. Schmidt, 2008), and this article examines how the discourses of 
legislative actors are affected by the institutional design.1 One of the main distinctions we can 
make in terms of how political systems are organised is that between what comparative 
political science has termed “consociational” or “consensus” democracy on the one hand and 
“majoritarian” systems on the other (Lijphart, 1977, 2012; Steiner, 1974). The difference 
between the two can be seen in the fact that consensus democracies have a more 
accommodating character, they integrate different interests and actor groups, seek to formally 
1 Social movement scholars examining those constellations that allow civil society actors to influence the 
political process have proposed frameworks such as the “political opportunity structure” (Kriesi, 2004). 
Although their research interest is a different one, since it focuses on non-institutional actors and the 
circumstances under which they can have a voice in the political process, they still highlight the importance of 
political institutions. Indeed, Kriesi (2004) turns to Lijphart’s classification to distinguish the degree to which 
political institutions are accessible to civil society actors. By putting the institutional discourses and their context
at the centre of the analysis, the present study thus complements the work in the area of social movements.
3
include possible veto players at early stages in the policymaking process and strive to find 
common ground or at least a compromise that is acceptable to all.
Lijphart (2012), whose comparative study of 36 countries is one of the main reference 
points in the literature, refers to this kind of democracy as the “gentler”, “kinder” type. 
Switzerland is a prime example of a democracy with such accommodating arrangements, and 
from the research interest of the present paper we can highlight its most important 
dimensions: a multi-party system coupled with an oversized cabinet, in which the largest 
parties share political power; an electoral system based on proportional representation (for the
lower house), hence taking into consideration minority views and parties; and neo-corporatist 
arrangements through which leaders of peak organisations consult with each other and with 
political representatives, thus integrating them early on in the policymaking process.
This form of democracy is contrasted with majoritarian systems, which in many 
respects embody the opposite with regard to their institutional constellation. In their purest 
form, these systems are constituted by two competing parties that vie for absolute majority 
and a corresponding minimum-winning cabinet; a single legislative chamber; they have, as 
their name suggests, an electoral system working according to a winner-takes-all mode, thus 
over-representing the majority; and they incorporate a pluralist idea of representation of 
interest groups, which act independently from one another, are largely excluded from formal 
policymaking processes, and compete for access to the political system. Although not 
corresponding in each and every aspect to the ideal sketched here, the United Kingdom is 
traditionally taken as representative of the majoritarian system.
For Lijphart, these distinctions are not simply descriptive in nature, but ultimately lead 
to qualitative differences between the two types, and he strongly argues that consensus 
democracies make a difference in the sense that they perform better than majoritarian systems
on many indicators. From the perspective of the present article, we are not so much interested 
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in the normative aspect of Lijphart’s analysis, but rather in assessing the differences in how 
the two systems shape legislative discourses. Clearly, if, on the whole, consensus and 
majoritarian systems differ with respect to social welfare policies, environmental protection, 
criminal law, etc. (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 274–294), these differences should become apparent in 
the corresponding legislative deliberations and consultations.
In this context, two institutional mechanisms appear particularly relevant: first, the 
sharing of power in oversized, multi-party cabinets versus the concentration of power in 
minimum-winning or single-party cabinets. The effect of this dimension on legislative 
deliberations is that grand coalitions require the parties forming the government to cooperate 
and agree on policy positions. Furthermore, grand coalitions moderate the accentuation of 
differences between parties as they diminish the electoral competition between them (see 
Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steenbergen, 2004, p. 80). As an overall effect, we should 
therefore see a greater degree of discursive convergence in consensus democracies than in 
their majoritarian counterparts. The second dimension of importance concerns the distinction 
between pluralistic and corporatist systems. Pluralistic systems foreground the concept of a 
“marketplace of ideas” and correspondingly further the contest of a diversity of perspectives 
and arguments by interest groups and other non-institutional actors who vie for visibility in 
the legislative arena. Corporatism, in turn, is marked by greater coordination between actors 
located outside the legislative arena—interest groups, social movement organisations, 
scientists, etc. —who are incorporated into the policy formation process, leading to 
compromise and comprehensive agreements between them. The relative lack of competition 
and their inclusion in the policymaking process in corporatist systems means that non-
institutional actors can be expected to become less visible in the legislative arena than in 
pluralistic systems. The hypotheses developed below address these differences and thus allow 




The present study is generally based on the idea developed in the field of “discursive
institutionalism” which suggests that institutions have an effect on the structures of legislative
deliberations:  “They  define  the  […]  contexts  within  which  repertoires  of  more  or  less
acceptable (and expectable) ideas and discursive interactions develop” (V. A. Schmidt, 2008,
p. 314). Put differently, Schmidt argues that “institutions are therefore internal to the actors”
(2008, p. 314) and we can uncover the distinctive impact they exert in the imprints they leave
behind in legislative discourses (Kern, 2011; Steiner et al., 2004). Seen from the perspective
of  Lijphart’s  classification,  we should  thus  see  clear  differences  in  legislative  discourses
depending on the degree to which the respective institutions correspond more to the consensus
or the majoritarian type.
Our first hypothesis addresses the pluralist–corporatist dimension that constitutes one of
the  core  differences  between  majoritarian  and consensus  systems.  Because  of  the  limited
access of non-legislative actors in pluralist/majoritarian systems, and since in this type of
democracy policies remain contested from the early stages of agenda setting through to their
implementation, non-institutional actors constantly vie for attention of institutional members
and visibility in the legislative process (Scruggs, 1999). The opposite is the case for the neo-
corporatist/consensus  type  of  democracy,  where  interest  groups,  social  movement
organisations, etc. are integrated and extensively consulted by executive and legislative actors
at every stage of the policy process. This divergence in the role and status of non-institutional
actors between the two systems results in different expectations regarding their presence in
legislative discourses.
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Hypothesis 1: The more majoritarian a system, the greater the discursive visibility
of  non-institutional  actors  in  legislative  discourses.  By  contrast,  the  more  the
system embodies aspects of consensus democracy, the lower their visibility.
Our  second hypothesis  examines  the  integrative  effect  of  consensus  democracies  in
terms  of  how their  institutional  designs  promote  the  common ground between legislative
actors from different—often oppositional—parties and camps. This is mainly the result of
oversized,  multi-party cabinets and the concomitant need to compromise and cooperate as
well as the diminished importance of competition in elections  (Steiner et al., 2004, p. 80),
which means that discourses between the governing parties can never be too distant from one
another  (van de Wardt, 2013, pp. 5–7). Being associated more strongly with a deliberative
idea  of  democracy  (Habermas,  1996;  Steiner  et  al.,  2004) because  of  their  greater
inclusiveness and the “spirit  of accommodation”  (Lijphart,  1968) they promote,  consensus
systems should produce discourses that converge towards a common ground (Ferree, Gamson,
Gerhards,  &  Rucht,  2002).  Majoritarian  systems,  by  contrast,  exhibit  the  opposite
characteristics:  here,  minimum-winning  or  single-party  cabinets  demonstrate  a  sharp
distinction between the government and an opposition that tries to oust the incumbent party at
the elections, further accentuating the differences  (van de Wardt, 2013). These mechanisms
are expected to have an effect on both the diversity of the legislative discourse and the degree
of contentiousness with which it is debated.
Hypothesis  2a:  The  more  majoritarian  a  system,  the  greater  the  diversity  of
positions  uttered  in  legislative  discourses.  Conversely,  the  more  consensual  a
system, the more uniform the legislative discourse.
Hypothesis  2b:  The  more  majoritarian  a  system,  the  greater  the  degree  of
polarisation of legislative discourses. In turn, the more consensual the system, the
lower the degree of polarisation.
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Our final hypothesis  combines the two institutional  dimensions assumed to exert  an
effect on legislative discourses. Both the prevailing pluralism in majoritarian democracies—
where interest groups and other non-institutional actors compete for attention and recognition
by the political system—and the fact that in these systems political parties tend to emphasise
their differences, should lead to an overall greater intensity of political debates and higher
visibility of the issue than in consensus democracies. In the latter, with the accommodating
configurations  of  the  institutions,  which  integrate  non-institutional  actors  throughout  the
policymaking  process  and  promote  cooperation  between  political  parties,  the  divide  that
separates  the  camps  on  an  issue  is  smaller  and  the  institutional  debate  can  therefore  be
expected to be less prominent on the political agenda.
Hypothesis 3: The more majoritarian a system, the higher the salience of contentious issues on
the political agenda. In opposition to this, the more consensual a system, the lower the 
salience of contentious issues on the political agenda.
2. Methods
2.1. Case Selection: Countries
We  have  chosen  four  countries  that  occupy  opposing  extremes  on  the  dimensions
outlined  above (pluralism/neo-corporatism and single-party cabinets/oversized  cabinets)  to
examine the relationship between institutional configurations and legislative discourses. Of
the four countries, both the US and, even more so, the UK concentrate political  power in
minimum-winning or single-party cabinets and accordingly reach some of the highest mean
values  in  Lijphart’s  index of executive power concentration  (Lijphart,  2012, pp.  79–104).
Adopting values between zero (greatest dispersion) to one hundred (greatest concentration),
the UK has an average value of 96.9 and the US of 81.2 on Lijphart’s index that measures the
amount of time the countries have been ruled by either minimum-winning or single-party
cabinets. Germany and Switzerland represent the contrasting cases, with Germany reaching a
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mean value of 36.2 and Switzerland of 4.1. The latter, in particular, is a prime example of a
power-sharing executive with its tradition of oversized cabinets that, until recently, included
the largest political parties.
In line with the distinction between power-sharing and power-concentrating executives,
the four countries also adopt opposing extremes on the pluralism–corporatism axis (Lijphart,
2012, pp. 158–173). Countries that concentrate power in the executive tend to be more on the
pluralist side, marked by fierce competition between independent interest groups vying for
attention  and political  influence,  and indeed,  the  US and the UK are third and fourth in
Lijphart’s classification of 36 democracies, achieving scores of 3.31 (US) and 3.38 (UK) of a
theoretical maximum of 4 (see Lijphart, 2012, pp. 158–173 for a detailed description of the
construction of the index). Conversely, Germany and, above all, Switzerland are closer to the
neo-corporatist  pole:  reaching  values  of  1.38  (D)  and  1.00  (CH),  these  countries  are
characterised by national peak associations that are integrated throughout the policymaking
process,  coordinating  their  affairs  among  each  other  and  displaying  a  general  orientation
towards compromise
With our hypotheses in mind, we can thus expect that climate change is most contested
and most salient in the political discourse of the UK, whereas the Swiss consensus system
should lead to the opposite effect and result in the lowest degrees of polarisation and salience.
The United States and Germany are located in between, with the US leaning towards the UK,
and Germany closer to Switzerland.
Figure 1
Switzerland,  Germany,  the  UK  and  the  US  according  to  Lijphart’s  classification  of
democracies
Consensus Majoritarian
Switzerland Germany United Kingdom United States
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2.2. Issue selection: Climate change
We  take  climate  change  as  an  issue  to  investigate  how  the  institutional  settings
influence the political discourse: due to its global nature and the fact that it is dealt with in
supranational  political  institutions  such as  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on
Climate  Change  and  its  annual  conferences,  climate  change  occupies  a  position  on  the
national political agenda of the countries selected.
Furthermore, in contrast to the strong scientific consensus (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, &
Schneider,  2010;  Oreskes,  2004) on  climate  change  that  underpins  the  research  into  its
development and the anthropogenic contribution to it, as a political issue it is riddled with
lines  of  conflict  that  lead  to  debates  about  its  causes,  the  general  seriousness  of  it,  the
feasibility of proposed adaptive or mitigating measures, etc. In other words, climate change as
a political issue offers room for contention that should become visible to different degrees in
legislative discourses. Finally, from the viewpoint of Lijphart’s classification of democratic
systems, environmental policies represent an area where differences between consensus and
majoritarian democracies come particularly to the fore (Wiarda, 1997).
2.2.1. Climate change and the structure of public discourse. Although research on
climate change as a political issue indeed suggests differences between countries according to
their  system type,  the studies in  the area have so far only examined the media  and their
coverage (see, e.g., A. Schmidt, Ivanova, & Schäfer, 2013). Comparative investigations into
legislative discourses are virtually  non-existent,  which warrants all  the more the approach
taken in the present article. To our mind, the only existing research on legislative discourses
of climate change is Fisher, Waggle and Leifeld’s (2012) single case study of hearings of the
US Congress. Their work reveals a higher degree of agreement between the political actors on
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the science of climate change than is reported by the media. At the same time, however, there
remains a deep divide with regard to the kind of policy that is most apt to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions without affecting the country’s economic performance too strongly.
Apart  from this  specific  study,  the existing  comparative  work reveals  some general
points about the structure of the issue, which can inform the present analysis. Specifically,
research  into  climate  change  coverage  has  contributed  to  generating  a  more  detailed
understanding of the actors in the field and their positions. One of the major insights we can
glean  from their  reading  is  that  the  basic  political  structure  of  the  field  is  given  by  the
opposition between climate advocates, who perceive the consequences of climate change and
the anthropogenic contribution to it as a problem, and climate sceptics, who question these
points to various degrees (Boykoff, 2007; Grundmann, 2007; Kaiser & Rhomberg, 2015). The
alliance structure underlying both camps is rather diversified and includes political  actors,
non-governmental  organisations,  enterprises,  interest  groups,  think  tanks,  bloggers,  etc.
(Grundmann & Scott, 2014; Sharman, 2014). Importantly, and in addition to this, Rahmstorf’s
(2004) critical  reading of climate sceptical contributions to the debate shows that they far
from constitute a homogeneous group. Confirmed in a comparative study by Painter and Ashe
(2012),  we can distinguish three different  types  of climate  scepticism according to  which
aspect they call into question: trend sceptics doubt the generally acknowledged trajectory of
global warming; attribution sceptics,  in turn, reject  the degree to which climate change is
ascribed to human behaviour; and impact sceptics emphasise possible benefits arising from
global  warming while  often opposing binding regulations.  These distinctions  will  play an
important  role  in  developing the  content  analytical  instrument  and in  the  analysis  of  our
corpus of legislative discourses.
2.3. Measures and method of data analysis
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2.3.1. Quantitative content analysis.  To answer our research question and analyse
the  discussion  about  climate  change  within  politics,  we conducted  a  quantitative  content
analysis. Our sample period was one year from 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013.
To get a comprehensive picture of the legislative debate, we included all parliamentary
documents  as  well  as  all  publicly  available  documents  of  relevant  committees  of  both
parliamentary  houses  dealing  with  climate  change for  each country  (see Appendix A).  A
document was included in the sample if one of the search terms “climate change” or “global
warming”  (for  the  German  documents:  “Klimawandel”  or  “globale  Erwärmung”)  was
mentioned somewhere in the document. Within the Swiss political system some debates are
held  in  French  and  their  transcripts  were  indexed  using  the  corresponding  search  terms
“changement climatique” or “réchauffement climatique”.
The coding took place on two levels: first, several formal variables (country, date, type
of document) were coded at the document level. Then the coders identified all actors in a
document  expressing  an  opinion  towards  climate  change.  An actor  might  be  a  politician
directly quoted in a document or it might be an external source capable of expressing his/her
opinion. At the actor level (the second level of the coding), several variables about the actor
type and the content  of the actors’  statements  were coded as follows.  These actor–frame
sequences were the unit of analysis (Germany  N=116; Switzerland  N=21; United Kingdom
N=1333; USA N=1058).
Actor type. All actors were coded according to their actor type (political actor, socio-
economic  actor,  civil  society  organisations/NGOs,  scientists/experts,  journalists/media,
individual citizens).
Frame  elements. Following  Entman  (1993),  we  define  frames  as  interpretation
packages consisting of different elements (see also Matthes & Kohring, 2008). In our coding
logic, a frame is always linked to an actor (=speaker) who uses it in a specific discourse.
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Thus, in order to explore which frames were used in the political debate about climate change,
we coded for each actor:  (1) the actor’s problem definitions of climate change (beliefs or
denials that climate change is occurring, opinions that climate change is a problem or not, and
perspectives on climate change), (2) their causal interpretations of climate change (i.e. human
or natural causes), (3) any positive or negative consequences of global warming, and (4) the
actor’s  recommended  remedies  for  mitigating  climate  change  or  adapting  to  possible
consequences.
The coding was completed by six trained coders. The reliability for the variables at the
actor-argument level was Krippendorff’s Alpha = .75 (see Appendix B for detailed reliability
scores).
2.3.2. Identification of frames.  To identify the frames used in the political debate
about climate change in the different countries, a hierarchical cluster analysis was used. As
we found that only 21 actors in Switzerland voiced their opinion on climate change during our
sample period, we excluded these cases from frame detection and ran the cluster analysis only
on the actor–frame sequences from the German, British and US political debates. The key
advantage  of  including  all  three  countries  in  the  same analysis,  instead  of  running  three
different analyses, is that the results can be compared directly.
The single frame elements were combined into frames using different steps. First, we
excluded any variables that occurred less than one per cent in all three countries (Matthes &
Kohring, 2008); in the end, 47 variables were included in the cluster analysis. Second, we
computed a hierarchical cluster analysis using the single-linkage algorithm in order to identify
any outliers. As no outliers could be identified, all actor–frame sequences were included in
the analysis. We then ran a hierarchical cluster analysis using the Ward algorithm and the
Euclidian distance measure for binary data to identify the actual frames. Using the elbow
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criterion (i.e. the increase of the error square sum), a three-cluster solution seemed to best fit
our data.  However,  this solution turned out to be insufficiently differentiated and we thus
decided to use a four cluster solution, whose frames are distinct from each other and can be
interpreted in a straightforward way. Examining the shape of the means of the cluster-forming
variables  (tested  with  an  ANOVA;  p-value  <  .05),  we found that  four  variables  did  not
significantly differ between the four clusters and they were thus excluded from the analysis.
The four frames identified through this  procedure address different  aspects of the climate
change  debate:  the  first  frame  represents  the  position  of  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on
Climate Change (IPCC), the second frame emphasises the negative consequences of climate
change, the third frame outlines a minimal consensus that could realistically be achieved by
the  involved  parties,  and  the  fourth  articulates  trend  and  attribution  sceptical  positions
(Rahmstorf, 2004) with regard to the occurrence and causes of climate change. 
Frame 1: “Position of the IPCC” (USA: 22%, UK: 54%, D: 49%).  The first frame
represents the main arguments of the IPCC: it explains that climate change is occurring, and
that  it  is  problematic.  The  perspective  on  the  problem  is  climate  protection.  The  frame
mentions  anthropogenic  contributions  as  causes  of  climate  change  and  emphasises  the
importance of mitigation measures to lessen global warming and to soften possible negative
consequences. These measures addressed include binding policy rules as well as voluntary
agreements.
Frame 2:  “Negative  consequences  of  climate  change” (USA:  41%,  UK: 15%, D:
25%). Similar to the first frame, the second frame also states that climate change occurs, and
it acknowledges that global warming involves several problems. The perspective on climate
change taken within this frame is that of possible negative consequences. Correspondingly,
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the frame highlights various negative impacts of global warming: deglaciation, the increase of
extreme weather events and natural disasters, sea-level rises and coastal/island flooding, and
the shortage of water for drinking and agriculture. On a more general level, the frame also
highlights the negative consequences for the ecosystem (e.g. damage to ecological systems,
decrease  of  vegetation  zones,  the  expulsion  of  species),  the  economy  (e.g.  damage  to
infrastructure  and  buildings,  crop  failure),  or  society  (e.g.  poverty,  damage  to  health,
dissemination of diseases). Additionally, measures to adapt to these negative consequences
are supported (e.g. the construction of higher dykes as a protection against floods). The frame
also includes a general call for action.
Frame 3: “Voluntary adaptation to climate change” (USA: 19%, UK: 21%, D: 22%).
The third frame also mentions that climate change occurs. However, in contrast to the first
two frames, it states that climate change causes some problems but that global warming is not
problematic.  The specific  views taken by this  frame on climate  change are the causes of
climate change, possible adaptation to its consequences, financial aspects (i.e. costs caused by
climate  change)  and the  role  of  politics.  Furthermore,  adaptation  measures  are  supported
without proposing far-reaching mitigation measures. These should be realised via funding,
subsidies or other financial incentives. 
This  interpretative  pattern  can  be  used  either  by  climate  advocates  or  by  climate
sceptics: on the one hand, this frame can be interpreted as the minimum level of consensus
which could be realistically achieved by the involved countries. On the other hand, it can be
used to argue against the necessity of binding regulations, which in turn is related to impact
scepticism (Rahmstorf, 2004). This second interpretation is supported by the data analysis, as
this third frame merges with the fourth, purely sceptical, frame. 
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Frame 4: “Trend/attribution scepticism” (USA: 18%, UK: 11%, D: 3%).  The fourth
frame is purely sceptical. First, it includes the opinion that climate change is not occurring, or
at least that it is not possible to prove whether or not climate change is occurring. This form of
scepticism is labelled “trend scepticism” by Rahmstorf (2004). The perspective on climate
change focuses either on technologies or is very general in the sense that no specific aspect is
highlighted.  Concomitant  with  this  general  denial  of  climate  change  is  the  view  that
anthropogenic  contributions  are  not  clear,  that  natural  causes  are  responsible  for  the
phenomenon (a position named “attribution scepticism” by Rahmstorf, 2004) or that climate
change is a conspiracy theory or merely a hoax. The fourth frame also denies that rising
temperatures or extreme weather events are a consequence of climate change, or it describes
any correlation between them as being unclear.  Furthermore, it  mentions deglaciation as a
consequence (without assessment).
3. Results
3.1. Salience of climate change in the legislative debate
To answer our research question with regard to how institutional configurations affect
the structure of the political debate in legislative bodies, we first take a look at the salience of
climate change in the political debate in each country. We expect that the higher degree of
contentiousness in majoritarian systems compared to consensual systems leads to a higher
salience of issues on the political agenda in majoritarian settings compared to their consensual
counterparts (H3). 
Table 1 displays the number of actors voicing their opinion about climate change in
the political  debate in each country.  The results  clearly support our hypothesis:  being the
strongest majoritarian system, the UK shows the highest visibility, followed closely by the
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US. In contrast to this, the debate is hardly visible in Germany and Switzerland, where the
issue registers almost no institutional resonance, above all, in the latter.
Table 1
Salience of the discussion about climate change within the legislative discourse





Note. Absolute number of actor–frame sequences in each country.
3.2. Type of speakers in the legislative discourse about climate change
The institutional setting may also influence the type of actors able to raise their voice in
legislative debates: whereas in corporatist countries access to the political system is limited to
a few large interest groups with institutionalised access, pluralist systems work differently. In
those systems, a plurality of interest groups, institutional representatives and single citizens
struggle for influence. These interest groups, institutional representatives and citizens speak
up  in  the  political  process  either  by  writing  letters  and  statements  that  are  read  out  in
committee meetings or by serving as witnesses in hearings. Hypothesis 1 therefore expects
that non-political actors are more prominent in the legislative debates of pluralist countries
compared to their corporatist counterparts. 
Table 2 confirms this hypothesis. Although in all countries political actors dominate
the legislative debate, this dominance is clearly weaker in pluralist countries. A closer look
reveals that mainly scientific actors and experts, followed by civil society organisations and
socio-economic actors, have access to the political arena. This variety of actors can also be
observed in the UK—although, contrary to our expectation,  to a lesser degree (19% non-
political actors). Conversely, non-political actors are almost invisible in the legislative debates
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in Germany and Switzerland, the two in our sample.  Our findings thus attest  to the main
difference  between  consensus  and  majoritarian  democracies,  but  they  equally  reveal
inconsistencies  within  these  categories,  as  the  expected  order  of  the  countries  is  partly
reversed.
Table 2
Distribution of actor types within the legislative debate on climate change (%)
Actor type US UK D CH
Political actors 65 81 96 95
Socio-economic actors 5 8 - 5
Civil society organisations 7 5 - -
Scientific actors/experts 18 6 4 -
Media/journalists 3 1 - -
Single citizens 3 1 - -
Note. 1’058 (US), 1’333 (UK), 116 (D), 21 (CH) actors. Cramer’s V=.16, p<.001.
3.3. Diversity and polarisation of positions in the legislative discourse
Finally, hypotheses 2a and 2b address the degree of diversity and polarisation in the
legislative  discourse  in  different  institutional  arrangements.  Hypothesis  2a  assumes  that
majoritarian  democracies  show  a  greater  diversity  of  positions  compared  to  consensus
democracies.  In  our  study,  we measured  the  positions  concerning  climate  change  with  a
framing  analysis,  though  due  to  low case  numbers,  we  had  to  exclude  Switzerland  (see
above). Table 3 shows that the used frames in the US debate about climate change are more
diverse and the proportions distributed more equally between the different positions than in
the  other  countries.  To  better  compare  the  distributions  in  the  different  countries,  we
calculated the Herfindahl Index of concentration. In our case, with four distinct frames, this
index varies between .25 and 1. A value of .25 indicates that all four frames are expressed to
an equal degree, whereas a value of 1 indicates that the distribution is highly concentrated. 
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The results of the Herfindahl Index support hypothesis 2a on a general level: we find a
greater diversity of positions in the majoritarian countries, most prominently in the US, than
in the consensus democracy of Germany. However, in contrast to our expectations, the frame
diversity is stronger in the US than in the UK, although the UK more strongly resembles the
ideal of a majoritarian democracy.
Table 3
Distribution of frames on climate change in the different countries (%)
Frame USA UK D
IPCC position 22 54 49
Negative consequences 41 15 25
Voluntary adaptation 19 21 22
Trend/attribution scepticism 18 11 3
Herfindahl Index of concentration 
(Min=1/N=.25; Max=1)
.29 .37 .44
Note. 1’058, 1’333, and 116 actors in the USA, the UK, and D, respectively. Cramer’s V=.26,
p<.001.
A closer look at the positions voiced in these legislative debates allows us to judge
whether majoritarian democracies not only show a greater diversity of positions, but also if
this  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  greater  degree  of  polarisation  compared  to  consensus
democracies  (H2b).  Polarisation  occurs  to  the  degree  that  legislative  discourses  embody
contrasting and extreme positions. In the present case we can speak of a polarised debate if (a)
both climate advocates and sceptical voices are present to an equal extent, and if (b) within
the two camps the more extreme positions dominate.
To test the hypothesis, we first have to arrange the frames on a continuum spanning
climate advocate and sceptical positions. The first two frames “position of the IPCC” and
“negative consequences of climate change” both express climate advocate opinions, but they
differ significantly in the articulated need for action. Whereas the IPCC frame emphasises the
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necessity to mitigate  climate change and calls for binding policy regulations,  the negative
consequences  frame  only  incorporates  measures  of  adaptation.  On  the  other  side  of  the
political spectrum, the “trend/attribution scepticism” frame represents a prototypical sceptical
position that calls into question both the occurrence of climate change and the anthropogenic
contribution. The “voluntary adaptation to climate change” frame, in turn, is more ambivalent,
though the analysis has shown that it is related more closely to the sceptical side. Based on
these  characterisations  the  extreme  advocate  position  is  represented  by  the  IPCC frame,
followed by the more moderate frame that emphasises the negative consequences of climate
change. Similarly, on the sceptical side, the voluntary adaptation to climate change is a more
measured position than the trend/attribution sceptical stance.
With regard to the first criterion (the presence of both positions), Table 3 shows that
the US displays the strongest degree of polarisation, followed by the UK and Germany. In the
US, 63% of the contributions to the legislative discourse are expressed by climate advocates
and 37% by sceptics. In Germany, the ratio is 75% (advocates) to 25% (sceptics), whereas the
UK is located in between. The table presents a more mixed picture, however, once we turn to
the second criterion, the presence of extreme sceptical and advocate positions: as the results
show, trend and attribution scepticism is most visible in the US (18%), followed by the UK
(11%) and Germany (3%).2 At the other end of the spectrum, the IPCC frame accounts for
22% of the legislative discourse in the US, compared to 54% in the UK and 49% in Germany.
The debates thus not only differ in the extent to which they are polarised, but also in
the direction of polarisation. Yet with regard to this latter aspect the divide is not so much
between  majoritarian  and  consensus  democracies,  but  between  the  US and  the  European
countries.  The US and the UK are more polarised  than Germany in terms of the overall
discursive presence of the two camps—criterion (a)—which is in line with our hypothesis.
2 Interestingly, it is non-political actors that more forcefully push the sceptical side in the US compared to the 
political actors themselves. In contrast, in the UK, non-political actors disproportionally support the IPCC frame.
For detailed results, see Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
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Contrary  to  our  assumptions,  however,  it  is  the  UK and Germany  whose  discourses  are
skewed towards the extremes, though above all in terms of the climate advocate side of the
debate.  The  US  exhibit  the  opposite  pattern,  as  of  the  three  countries  their  legislative
deliberations display the strongest drive towards the sceptical extreme; this position is much
less visible in the UK and next to inexistent in the German debate.3
On the whole, the results of the analysis partly confirm hypothesis H2b. With respect
to  the  first  criterion  they  show  that  legislative  discourses  in  majoritarian  democracies
represent both sides of the debate more evenly than those in consensus systems, though the
expected order between the US and the UK is reversed. The second criterion reveals a more
complex relationship between institutional configurations and parliamentary debates, which to
some extent contradicts the assumptions: while the UK and Germany are polarised towards
the advocate extreme, the US displays a trend in the opposite direction. Moreover, the latter
shows a more balanced form of polarisation between the extremes, though overall on a lower
level than Germany and the UK.
4. Discussion
4.1. Summary and theoretical implications
The aim of our study was to analyse how different institutional configurations affect the
structure of political  debates. In our hypotheses, we assumed that the differences between
majoritarian and consensus democracies have an influence on the visibility of non-political
actors  within  legislative  discourses,  the  diversity  and  the  degree  of  polarisation  of  the
expressed positions,  and, related  to  this,  the general  salience of the issue on the political
agenda. 
3 Indeed, trend/attribution scepticism in Germany is a methodological artefact due to the fact that the cluster 
analysis was conducted across three countries. If we conduct a separate frame analysis for the German discourse 
alone, the extreme sceptical frame disappears. 
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The results broadly support our assumptions on all three dimensions and thus confirm
the  postulated  relationship  between  legislative  settings  and  their  discursive  properties;
although,  within  the  two  main  categories,  the  countries  also  contradicted  some  of  the
expectations. Generally, the majoritarian systems in the US and UK enable a greater number
of  non-political  actors—scientists,  civil  society  actors,  socio-economic  actors—to  express
their position directly or indirectly in the debates than can do so in the consensus democracies
of Germany or Switzerland. In the latter, discourses are elite-centred and exclude other, non-
institutional, actors. 
Related  to  this,  majoritarian  systems  in  general  tend  to  display  a  higher  degree  of
polarisation than consensus democracies, though there are also significant exceptions. In line
with this finding, the positions articulated in the majoritarian systems of the UK and the US
are also more diverse, resulting primarily from the high(er) salience of sceptical arguments
expressed in their legislative debates. These mechanisms finally lead to the issue having the
highest degree of salience in the US, followed by the UK, Germany and Switzerland. These
results  also illustrate  that  institutional  configurations  lead to  “epistemological  hierarchies”
(O'Neill,  Hulme,  Turnpenny,  &  Screen,  2010),  as  the  single  frames  are  pronounced  to
different  degrees  within  and across  the  four  legislative  bodies.  As a  general  mechanism,
institutional discourses move certain aspects further into the foreground and thus make certain
policies more obvious choices than others.
It is interesting to note in this context that the discourse of climate advocates displays an
additional line of contrast between the European countries and the US: whereas in the UK and
Germany the position of the IPCC, which also includes the demand for obligatory policy
rules,  dominates  the political  debate,  climate  advocates  in the US emphasise the negative
consequences  of climate  change and highlight  the measures required to adapt  to  them. A
possible explanation for this finding could be seen in the nature of the US climate change
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debate, which is generally marked by a strong presence of sceptical voices, representing a
broadly  based,  well-organised countermovement  reaching  far  beyond the  legislative  arena
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011). As a consequence of the sceptics’ foothold in the debate, climate
advocates have abandoned the call for fundamental reactions to climate change, which we still
see being voiced in the UK.
Discourses  in  consensus  democracies  tend  to  gravitate  towards  the  common  ground,
though  perhaps  coming  at  the  price  of  oppressing  significant  differences  between  the
positions. Climate change, in this respect, is an issue where from a normative viewpoint the
exclusion of the sceptical minority position can be seen as less detrimental as they hold a
scientifically unqualified position. In other policy areas, however, the status of minorities in
the legislative process might pose more of a problem, above all when the debate centres on
moral questions such as, for instance, abortion legislation. Here, consensus and integration
might well be considered synonymous with a hegemonic political order that inhibits social
change and suppresses the voices of those affected, thus leading to a disconnect between the
formal institutional arena and the informal public sphere. Majoritarian systems, in turn, allow
for, and indeed appear to further, the articulation of political differences. The downside here is
to be seen in the fact that instead of leading to convergence, these configurations consolidate
and emphasise political  conflict,  thus, in effect,  foreclosing the actors from establishing a
common ground between them. The possible detrimental consequences in this case consists
not so much in a “vertical” split between institutional politics and the public as in cementing a
“horizontal” division between two opposing positions that runs through legislative bodies and
society alike. Some of the research on the polarisation of the US Congress and the American
public seems to suggest such a development (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Layman et al.,
2006),  and  in  terms  of  legislative  discourses,  climate  change  has  been  shown  to  be
particularly  divisive  (Guber,  2013).  At  the  same time,  institutional  configurations  do  not
prescribe social change, and since they are connected to society in various, complex ways,
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their inner workings are equally shaped by the dynamics and forces residing in the informal
public sphere.
4.2. Limitations and future research
While our study has been able to document the systematic  differences in legislative
discourses between consensus and majoritarian democracies,  it  has done so with a sample
limited to four countries and one issue, and covering only one year of parliamentary debates.
Therefore, the approach should be extended in further studies to investigate if our results can
be replicated in other settings with longer periods of analysis. Moreover, the high degree of
polarisation of the debate in the US might not be the sole product of the institutional setting.
Thus, the inclusion of other issues and additional countries could help to shed light on how
strongly  the  institutional  design  affects  the  discursive  structure.  With  regard  to  climate
change, its transnational dimension, such as the UN’s climate change conferences, should be
more  explicitly  integrated  into  the  analytical  model  as  it  can  be  reasonably  assumed  to
influence the structure of legislative discourses. Finally, linking the analysis of institutional
discourses to the coverage of climate change in the media would contribute to uncovering the
dynamics at play between the formal and the informal public sphere.
The framing approach used in our study has allowed us to analyse positions expressed
by the actors in an inductive way and to detect the underlying discursive patterns. At the same
time, this has resulted in extracting frames in isolation from one another, although the contest
of (opposing) frames is precisely what drives political  debates and the “give and take” of
reasons. In further studies, the interaction between frames should be examined more closely—
above all, since strategic framing is likely to involve forms of frame adaptation, reframing,
etc. as the debate develops.
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Appendix A: Included political documents for each country
A.1  Parliamentary  documents:  our  sample  includes  all  plenary  protocols  (including
annexes) of both parliamentary houses at the national level.
‒ Bundestag and Bundesrat (Germany) 
‒ Nationalrat and Ständerat (Switzerland) 
‒ House of Commons and House of Lords (UK) 
‒ House of Representatives and Senate (USA)
‒ Weekly Address of the President (USA)
A.2  Committees:  for  each  country  we  selected  the  committees  mainly  dealing  with
climate change.
Germany: 
‒ Bundestag: Ausschuss für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit
‒ Bundesrat: The documents of the committee of the Bundesrat are not publicly 
available and thus do not form part of our sample.
USA:
‒ Senate: Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
‒ House of Representatives: Committee on Energy and Commerce
CH:
‒ Nationalrat (UREK-N): Kommission für Umwelt, Raumplanung und Energie
‒ Ständerat (UREK-S): Kommission für Umwelt, Raumplanung und Energie
UK:
‒ House of Commons: Energy and Climate Change Committee
‒ House of Lords: There is no suitable committee dealing with climate change.
Appendix B: Detailed reliability scores for the used variables
Agreement concerning the identification of the three most important actors (MIAs): 77%
Table B.1
Reliability scores of variables coded on the actor-argument level
Variable Krippendorff‘s Alpha
Group the actor belongs to .82
Occurrence of climate change .69
Climate change seen as a problem .75
Perspective on climate change .70
Causes of climate change .75
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Consequences of climate change .76
Treatments .76














IPCC position 24 17 52 62
Negative consequences 47 30 15 14
Voluntary adaptation 15 26 23 14
Trend/attribution
scepticism
14 26 10 11
N 691 367 1073 260
Note. USA: Cramer’s V=.23, p<.001; UK: Cramer’s V=.10, p<.01
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